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PREFACE 
One of the recurring interests of most areas and programs 
at IIASA is the uses of models for policy analysis. This paper 
represents the results of the experiences of the three authors 
in the policy-modeling interface in the Food and Agriculture 
program, the Management and Technology area, the Resources and 
Environment area, and previous experiences with the Mesarovid- 
Pestel groups in Cleveland and Hannover, as well as the Free 
University of Berlin. 

We would like to thank our colleagues at IIASA for dis- 
cussing many of the ideas included in this paper with us. We 
are especially grateful to Olaf Helmer, Ed Quade, Asit Biswas, 
and Walter Spofford for reading the manuscript in some detail 
and making many useful suggestions on improving it. 

ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the major issues posed by scenario- 
based simulation modeling in the policy process, using agri- 
cultural policy as an example of a complex decision arena. 
Policy is seen as a process by which decision-makers use the 
instruments under their control to approach the general goals 
of society. Models can help to choose instrument settings, 
evaluate policy option, and assess their appropriateness to 
a particular situation. But they cannot design policy; the 
interactions between policy-makers and models are critical 
if modeling is to be useful in the policy process. Policy 
models must be oriented to the factors that focus and con- 
strain judgements in the real world, as well as toward the 
substantive problems motivating analyses. These include the 
actors within the system, as well as the geographic and dis- 
ciplinary contexts of the problems. Scenario-writing pro- 
vides a way of ordering understanding and judgement about 
different phenomena to help users interact most effectively 
with a model and to insure that the perspectives of the model 
are most appropriate to the needs of the decision-maker. 
It is an iterative and evolutionary process which can provide 
a great deal of insight into the assessment phase of policy 
design. 
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ON THE SCENARIO APPROACH TO SIIIULATION MODELING FOR 
COEIPLEX POLICY ASSESSMENT AND DESIGN 
MODELING IN POLICY ANALYSIS APiD DESIGN 
- -
Quantitative policy analysis with the use of simulation 
models is a young art whose outlines are only beginning to 
show some contours. In several countries modeling for poli- 
cy assessment and design is being used increasingly, while 
early and premature applications in others have led to set- 
backs, as high expectations which had been aroused were not 
met. This is especially true for applications to complex 
policy questions involving complex power structures and mul- 
tiple interest groups with diverse and often conflicting ob- 
jectives. The role of modeling in policy analysis and 
design hes been obscured by disagreements regarding the 
scientific rigor of models intended for policy application, 
their relevance to the policy arena, and their accessibility 
to decision makers in business or public office. 
Modeling for the purpose of supporting pol icy assess- 
ment and design will always remain an art to a certain de- 
gree (Quade, 1975). But in order to attain its full poten- 
tial in this area, it must develop a sound epistemological 
base oriented toward the policy process as well as 2 clearly 
defined view of both the substance of particular policy is- 
sues and the organizational framework within which policy 
outputs are to be implemented (Jenkins, 1978). That is, it 
must adopt a holistic view which includes the concerns of 
the natural and social sciences in the same context as the 
governing values and institutions of a society and the 
hard-nosed considerations and tradeoffs which policy-makers 
make in the real world. 
This pzper is a contribution to the epistemological 
base for modeling in the policy process. It concentrates on 
the scenario approach (see below), coupled with simulation 
modeling, using the management of agricultural systems as an 
example of a complex policy application. However, much of 
what we say should also be pertinent for other modeling ap- 
proaches and applications to other specific areas. 
The Mature of Policy 
- -
It is useful to distingush between "policy" as a yener- 
ic term and "a policy" as a specific decisional scheme. The 
generic term "policy" denotes the basic process by which dc- 
cisions arc mapped out, weighed, implemented, and adjusted. 
It implies goals to be met or motivations for change, a 
basic strategy and sequence of tactics for dealing with 
them, and a set of instruments available to the policy-maker 
through which he can exercise his mandate. It also includes 
the processes by which different goals, strategies, and tac- 
tics are weighed against each other and translated into ac- 
tions as well as the ways in which the system is monitored 
and adjustments are made to compensate for errors in the 
original assessmcnt. 
The motivations for policy tend to be qualitative and 
are generally rather loosely defined outcomes which the 
~olicy-maker would like to see as the result of his actions. 
These include things such as better health, greater happi- 
ness, more food, and a higher standard of living. A typical 
 decision-maker also has a more personal motivation, such as 
the desire to maintain or advance his own status within his 
bureau or that of his bureau within the wider political 
framework. Different individuals have different motivations 
for their actions, and the overall constellation of motiva- 
tions within a policy-making institution is generally 
characterized by an uncertain, and perhaps unstable, con- 
sensus. The instruments of policy are specific ''handles" 
through which the pol icy-maker can influence the system. No 
complex system is completely controllable. Indeed, rela- 
tively few factors can be consciously adjusted by a 
decision-maker. Those that can include things like taxing 
schemes and rates, savings rates, allocation mechanisms, 
quotas, tariffs, technology support through research and 
development, legislation, and the way in which police powers 
are used. 
Strategy and tactics are mappings between goals and in- 
struments. Strategy is the overall view within which prob- 
lem solutions are perceived. It is more general, and it al- 
lows for problems which arise along the way. Tactics are 
the specific short-term responses to conditions as they are 
perceived. They are more limited, and they utilize the 
actor's special abilities to manipulate certain instruments. 
The process of translating goals into strategies and stra- 
tegies into tactics, given an available set of instruments, 
is one of the main sub-processes of policy. There is no 
general way to do it, and the process is closely related to 
the policy-maker's perception of the set of instruments 
available to him, as well as their relative potency. Not 
all decision mak~rs perceive the usefulness of the various 
instruments in the same way; nor need they even see the same 
set of instruments as being available to them. So this as- 
pect of policy is a very open and individual process. Any 
attempt to use models to ai2 in policy asessment and design 
must recoqnize this fact. 
" A  ~olicy" is a much more restricted term referring to 
a given goal set, a set of strategies for these goals, and 
the associated sets of tactics and instruments for each ac- 
tor involved. A given goal may be reachable (at least in 
principle) through a wide range of alternatives, some of 
which may be radically different or even antithetical in 
places. In general a given policy will allow limited varia- 
tion of instrument settings within a tactic, of tactics 
within a strategy, and so forth. 
Policy design is the process of generating and assess- 
ing alternatives and choosing from among them (Figure 1). 
Each alternative has different implications, which must be 
understood so that the mcst appropriate can eventually be 
chosen for implementation. Alternative strategies are 
determined for a given goal set. Tactics must be generated, 
assessed, and chosen for each strategy. Then instruments 
must be fixed in the same way. This process is likely to 
lead to a relatively large number of feasible alternatives 
within the framework of a given goal set, and the implemen- 
tation of zny one may foreclose options on later development 
of others. 
The resulting multiplicity of options must be assessed 
and filtered to narrow the field so that one can ultimately 
be chosen for implementation in the real world. Ideally, 
this policy will be capsble of meeting its associated goals, 
or zt least of moving the system toward them. The alterna- 
tives discarded along the way may also be useful in helping 
to improve the efficiency of policy generation and assess- 
ment procedures, and they may also have some effect on modi- 
fying the goals directing the policy design process (Mendell 
and Tanner, 1975). 
Thc Role of Models 
---
Mathen~atical models are a formal way of organizing and 
presenting pol icy-relevant information (Quade, 1 9 5 5 )  . They 
have a role both in the generation and in the pre- 
implementation stage of the policy-design process. They can 
be used in the places in Figure 1 indicated by a double ar- 
row, but the types and purposes of models at each position 
are different. Those which calculate instrument settings 
are generally normative models which calculate ways of 
reaching social optima or which assess the trade-offs thzt 
must be faced by decision-makers (e.g. Haimes -- et al., 1975; 
heady, 197d). The structures of such models limit strategic 
considerations to a very narrow set with limited tactical 
capabilites. If the structural assumptions of the model 
(generally that the strategy and tactics of goal-seeking can 
be represented adequately by maximizing some identifiable 
welfare function) correspond to those of the decision-maker, 
then they border on irrelevance (Arnaszus, 1974). 
Other models provide estimates of the impact of policy 
options on the overall system. These tend to be large-scale 
descriptive simulation models which project the implications 
of particular instrument settings (e.g. Mesarovic and 
Pestel, 1974; Goeller -- et al., 1977). Such models serve to 
consider a wide range of strategies. The policy-generation 
step must precede their use so that instrument settings can 
be specified, and they have no policy generation capabil i- 
ties of their own. Still other models can evaluate the es- 
timated impact of policies. These tend to be relatively 
simple, abstract ways of relating structural changes to 
goal-seeking (e.g. Dinkel and Erickson, 1978, Kantor and 
Nelson, 1979). 
But no model can embody the policy design process, and 
no model can design policy. Too many judgements and in- 
terpretations must be made both by the analyst and the 
policy-maker. Modelers tend to be different kinds of people 
than policy-makers, with different outlooks and styles of 
operation. This places strong constraints on the use (or at 
least the acceptance) of certain analytical techniques and 
approaches (Martino and Lenz, 1977). No policy-maker would 
ever turn over primary pol icy-design responsibil ity to a 
computer-oriented analyst. The function of modeling is to 
assist the policy-maker, and it is a rather subsidiary role 
at that. 
The cr,iteria for judging the usefulness of a model are 
properly those of the policy-maker, not those of the 
modeler. Modelers commonly judge models on the basis of 
whether they are sophisticated, accurate, precise, realis- 
tic, general, or theory-based. These considerations are im- 
portant for the process of modeling, but they are hardly re- 
lated to the values of the decision-maker, which are orient- 
ed toward the end result. If a model of low sophistication 
and even low precision makes it easier for decision-makers 
to filter the options open to them, then it is more useful 
(or at least it is perceived to be so, even if the results 
of its use are pathologic) than a sophisticated, precise 
model for which the decision-maker does not readily see its 
role in the policy process as he perceives it. The "best" 
model in the world would be useless as a policy tool if 
policy-makers could not relate it to specific policies they 
wanted to assess or if it made assumptions which did not fit 
the realities of the political institutions associated with 
the problem (Majone, 1976). 
This implies two features that are basic to policy 
models. First, the model structure and the way in which it 
fits into the policy process must be capable of reflecting 
the standards and values of the policy-maker, as well as the 
realities of his associated institutional structure (Riswas, 
1975). It must consider at least his motivations and the in- 
struments of interest to him, and it must recognize the con- 
straints on his intensity, freedom, or speed of actions 
(e.g. Wall, 1976). It must be capable of considering or 
designing a constellation of instrument settings which 
corresponds both to his strategic and tactical inclinations. 
If it cannot, then it cannot deal with problems as the 
policy-maker visualizes them. Secondly, the model must be 
usable in the policy process. A model in this context is no 
more than a tool for people with wider interests, and they 
must be able to use it (Quade, 1971). 
Many modeling techniques involve optimization mechan- 
isms of one sort or another. These have proven very useful, 
both for designing policy where the strategy is clear and as 
a way of endogenizing behavioral responses which can be 
modeled fairly accurately and which are important factors 
affecting policy acceptance in the real world. Such 
behavioral modeling is often essential to following the 
proliferation of policy-generated impacts through the system 
(e.g. Spofford -- et al., 1976). However, a warning must also 
be entered: one must be very careful when endogenizing 
behavior in a model. The rules for this behavior must be 
well understood and accepted. But these rules are them- 
selves subject to change as the result of policy and other 
feedbacks within the society. Incorporating phenomena sub- 
ject to changing rules within the structure of a model is 
extraordinarily difficult. 
A useful policy model, then, must be more than a run- 
ning computer program. It needs to be a part of a system 
including not only the model but also a capacity for gen- 
erating alternative policies or policy scenarios, as well as 
the capacity for translating goals and instruments into 
model input and interpreting the results in such a way that 
they are relevant and understandable to policy-makers. The 
sophistication of the model is a constraint mainly on the 
detail of policy analysis that can be done using it. 
Indeed, the sophistication of the overall system really 
refers to the way the model is embedded into a method of 
use. There is an important distinction between quantifica- 
tion and sophisticat ion. Quantification is only one instru- 
rncnt of mathematical sophistication, albeit a very important 
one. iqathematics in its larger scnse deals with relations 
among concepts, magnitudes, indices, systems, etc. The 
pretention and attempts of many model-builders to quantify 
the whole socioeconomic process of a society is not only un- 
realizable; it is not even reasonable (Rapoport, 1979). 
AND 
-
PRODUC TI ON POLICY 
Let us confine ourselves hereafter to descriptive poli- 
cy assessment models, using agricultural production policy 
as an example. This is already an extraordinarily complex 
system. Food production must compete for variable inputs 
with all other sectors of the economy. It deals with bio- 
logical, pedolog ical , and hydrological spheres of the natur- 
al environment to which the farmer falls prey. These in- 
clude the population genetics of crop varieties, the commun- 
ity ecology of pests and weeds, and the effects of weather 
perturbations, climatic change, and the "downstream" effects 
of other producers. His efficiency is limited by the tech- 
nological tools available to him and by the state of the 
economy into which his production feeds. Moreover, a 
moderately complete description of the crop production sys- 
tem would have to consider at least half-a-dozen different 
actors' viewpoints. And this is only for crop production: 
in order to describe the overall agricultural situation in 
any country, we would also have to consider livestock pro- 
duction, marketing, commodity utilization patterns, the corn- 
petition between the agricultural and non-agricultural sec- 
tors of the economy, and so forth. 
A model which attempted to deal directly with any of 
these sectors might have to consider several of them because 
of their tight interconnectedness. But some of the most 
significant policy questions are related to goals not of any 
specific area but rather to those of several areas as they 
interact to comprise a larger system. Such an analysis must 
focus on the interrelationships between the constituent is- 
sues and disciplines as well as those issues and disciplines 
per sc. And the most important expressions of problems are 
likely to be in the interrelationships between various sub- 
systems rather than in the subsystems themselves. How many 
times, for example, have well-meaning decisions been made in 
which the true nature of the system was not understood, and 
whose results bordered on disaster? For example, the 
governments of several Andean counries have moved people out 
of their very crowded highlands to lowland areas, because 
living conditions were frankly quite bad in the highlands. 
But after a few years of slash-and-burn agriculture in the 
lowland areas for which they were not really prepared cul- 
turally or technically, the soils were no longer able to 
support the population, the people were worse off than they 
had been in the highlands, and the country's natural soil 
resource base was permanently damaged. 
The analysis of policies affecting complex situations 
such as this is an extraordinarily difficult and complicated 
undertaking which must necessarily be done by people trained 
not only in various substantive areas but also in under- 
standing and dealing with the interrelationships among them. 
No one person can be trained in all of these things, or even 
in very many of them. No single body of theory will ever 
cover everything involved. Indeed, any attempt to use a 
single disciplinary approach or single body of theory to do 
an analysis of complex policy would be committed to failure 
even before it started (Dillon, 1976). 
Actors 
In the same way, no single viewpoint is suitable for 
assessing or designing policy. Any decision-maker who is 
the primary user of a model will have a single viewpoint 
(his own). It may be complex and not entirely self- 
consistent, and it may change somewhat with his changing 
perceptions (Quade, 1975; Biswas, 1976). But a model which 
is capable of dealing with complex policy notions is likely 
to have multiple users with multiple viewpoints. And even 
if this is not the case, any system on which a policy is be- 
ing imposed contains different actors with different goals, 
roles, viewpoints, and impacts on the overall system. These 
are real people and real institutions, and their interrela- 
tionships are themselves complex and dynamic. We seldom 
wish to analyze the policy decisions of all of the actors in 
any real system. But all do affect it, and one cannot wish 
away their impact simply because an analysis focuses on the 
decisions available to a single key actor. 
Actors' roles tend to be best understood in qualitative 
terms, and few model-builders are equipped to understand 
their place jn a quantitative analysis. One of the first 
interactions between the modeler and his client must there- 
fore be to develop a clear-cut identification of the actors 
in the system and the relations of each to the key actors on 
whose policy decisions the analysis will concentrate (Roys- 
ton and Perkowski, 1975). Figure 2 shows some of the actors 
that might be invclved in a typical agricultural system. 
They are shown as a hierarachy with certain lines of commun- 
ication between adjacent levels. Decisions made at high 
levels can be frustrated by the actions of those lower in 
the hierarchy, or they may be amplified by concomitant deci- 
sions of those lower actors. The same is true in the oppo- 
site direction (e.g. Jenkins, 1978, Chapter 7). 
The goals of different actors may be the same, dif- 
ferent, or overlapping. Some can be expressed easily, oth- 
ers only with extreme difficulty (Donald, 1976). There are 
commonly some agreed-upon national goals to which all actors 
would submit, but these tend to be quite fuzzy. As we iden- 
tify actors more specifically, their role differences begin 
to stand out, and their goals diverge until those of one ac- 
tor may conflict strongly with those of another. They can 
be of a very different character, and some are dominant over 
others (Eossel, 1977). To decide which of these types of 
goals are relevant to a given modeling effort is a difficult 
task, but it must be carried through conscientiously, as 
goals underlie the motivations for different actors' actions 
in a given situation, and they are a basis for evaluation of 
the results of those actions. This becomes even more com- 
plex when results begin to affect the goals. 
Actors are always decision-makers, even if they affect 
only a very small portion of the system. Even the small 
ones identify sets of instruments, tactics, strategies, and 
goals. But their decisions are always oriented toward their 
role in the system, and their impact is conditioned upon 
their position in the hierarchy. The decision to neglect a 
given actor generally means either that we want to ignore 
the instruments at his disposal or that we wish to lump them 
in with somebody else's instruments that are already being 
considered. But instruments gain their importance by their 
strategic location and by the sensitivity of the overall 
system to their use. Important instruments -- and hence im- 
portant actors -- cannot be neglected (Schultze, 1968). 
Focusinq -- on Real Problems - -  in a Model Context 
Models are inherently abstractions and seldom contain 
elements that are exact replicas of the phenomena found in 
real life. So the use of a rnodel involves a translation 
from the goals, strategies, tactics, or instruments which 
are of greatest relevance to the policy-maker into terns 
which are compatible with the model. The translation from 
instrument settings into model input is as critical and dif- 
ficult a phase of using models for complex policy analysis 
and design as the formulation of specific policies from gen- 
eralized goals. 
The most difficult step in the translation process is 
often specification of analytical boundaries. Policy in the * 
real world operates in an infinite context. Models cannot. 
Clear decisions must limit the extent of the system to be 
considered and define the remainder as the environment or 
the context of that system. There are many ways of looking 
a t  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i n  a n y  g i v e n  a n a l y s i s .  P e r h a p s  t h e  s i m -  
p l e s t  i s  t h e  m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y  v i e w  s u g g e s t e d  by a  Venn d i -  
agrain o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  d i s c i p l  i n e s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  a n  a n a l y s i s  
( F i g u r e  3 ) .  T h i s  is o n e  way o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  r a n g e  o f  
s u b s t a n t i v e  a r e a s  which  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  
o u t  a m e a n i n g f u l  a n a l y s i s .  I f  a n y  g i v e n  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  ap- 
p r o a c h  d o e s  n o t  i n t e r s e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w i t h  o t h e r  d i s c i p -  
l i n e s ,  t h e n  i t  need  n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  
T h e r e  a r e  a l s o  ways o f  f o c u s i n g  o n  a  p r o b l e m  by decom- 
p o s i n g  t h e  s y s t e m  a l o n g  h i e r a r c h i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  a l o n g  d i s -  
c i p l i n a r y  l i n e s .  A Venn d i a g r a m  c a n  i d e n t i f y  t h e  a r e a s  
which  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  and some o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  which  
must  b e  a s k e d .  Bu t  how d e e p l y  i n t o  a n y  o f  t h e s e  d i s c i p l i n e s  
need  a n a l y s i s  go?  What b o d i e s  o f  t h e o r y  s h o u l d  b e  used i n  
e a c h ,  a t  what  d e t a i l ,  and  f o r  what  p u r p o s e ?  Most m a t u r e  
d i s c i p l  i n e s  compr ise sets o f  i s s u e s  and  s u b d i s c i p l  i n e s  t h a t  
c a n  b e  a r r a y e d  h i e r a r c h i c a l l y .  An e x a m p l e  s h o w i n g  a  decom- 
p o s i t i o n  o f  e c o n o m i c s  f o r  a model  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
is g i v e n  i n  F i g u r e  4 .  The c e n t r a l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  a g r i -  
c u l t u r a l  p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  economy is  c l e a r ,  and t h e y  a r e  
shown w i t h i n  t h e  d a s h e d  l i n e s .  B u t  i t  is n o t  c l e a r  a  p r i o r i  
how much d e t a i l  o f  t h e  a r e a s  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  d a s h e d  l T n e s  
mus t  b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  make m e a n i n g f u l  e c o n o m i c  j u d g e -  
m e n t s  f o r  t h i s  s y s t e m  a s  a  w h o l e .  A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
p r o c e s s  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  s y s t e m  b o u n d a r i e s ,  o n e  u s u a l l y  a s -  
sumes t h a t  t h e r e  is some l e v e l  w i t h i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  a b o v e  
which  o n e  no  l o n g e r  n e e d s  t o  c o n s i d e r  p r o c e s s e s  e x p l i c i t l y .  
T h i s  a l l o w s  a b o u n d a r y  t o  b e  set a t  t h i s  l e v e l  a n d  is 
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s a y i n g  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  coming down a c r o s s  i t  
i n t o  t h e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  t h a t  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a r e  con-  
s t a n t ,  known, or  embodied  i n  p a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t i o n s .  
B u t  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  f e a t u r e s  o f  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  a 
h i e r a r c h y  is  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a d a p t i v e  ( M e s a r o v i c  -- e t  a l . ,  
1 9 7 0 ) .  They r e s p o n d  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  lower l e v e l s .  And i t  
is r i s k y  t o  d r a w  s y s t e m  b o u n d a r i e s  a t  p o i n t s  s e p a r a t i n g  t h e  
model s y s t e m  f r o m  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  which  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  a d a p t  
( a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t o  c h a n g e )  t o  s i g n a l s  f r o m  a  lower l e v e l  n o t  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  is e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  
p o l i c y  m o d e l s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  b e c a u s e  many o f  t h e  p o l i c i e s  
w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  i m p a c t  o n  a g r i c u l t u r e  a r e  n o t  d i r e c t e d  to- 
w a r d s  a g r i c u l t u r e  per se ,  b u t  a r e  r a t h e r  t h e  a d a p t i v e  
r e s p o n s e s  o f  p o l i c y - m a k e r s  t o  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. 
The c o m p e t i t i o n  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  among s e c t o r s  may h a v e  a  
g r e a t e r  i m p a c t  o n  a g r i c u l t u r e  t h a n  d i r e c t  p o l i c y  i n t e r v e n -  
t i o n s  w i t h i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p o l i c y  
may f a v o r  t h e  u s e  o f  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  f e r t i l i z e r s  and p e s t i -  
c i d e s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  w i l l  s u p -  
p o r t  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n  i n d i g e n o u s  c h e m i c a l  i n d u s t r y ,  
some o f  whose p r o d u c t s  would b e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c h e m i c a l s .  I f  
t h e  i n d u s t r y  is s u c c e s s f u l ,  t h e n  f e r t i l i z e r  and p e s t i c i d e  
production are carried along, with beneficial results to 
agriculture. But if it is badly managed or otherwise unsuc- 
cessful, the agricultural components may suffer, even if 
their markets are sound. In either? ease, the prosperity of 
the overall chemical industry has a'much larger role in the 
success of fertilizer and pesticide ptoduction than agricul- 
tural input policies. 
Problems and Processes 
-
The taxonomies presented so far are basic to any model 
designed for complex policy analysis. But the hierarchies 
shown in Figure 4 or the interrelations among discipl ines 
shown in Figure 3 seldom appear explicitly in policy- 
oriented models. We model processes. Whatever resemblance 
exists between the processes modeled and the disciplines 
considered is generally because model-builders have been 
trained in one or more specific disciplines, and the 
outlooks or perceptions of those disciplines provide them 
with the easiest entry into their description of a system. 
Conflicts between the perspectives of different ap- 
proaches often affect the types or philosophies of a model- 
ing exercise. One of the most critical is between simul- 
taneity as commonly assumed withfn econometric studies and 
strict contingency relationships as assumed within systems 
dynamics and related approaches. In most real-world agri- 
cultural systems, both type can be perceived, and realism 
requires retaining the differences. 
Neither type is simple. For example, the contingency 
relationships in the system can be as illustrated in Figure 
5. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that each of 
these processes is represented by a model which is drawn 
from the appropriate body of theory from some discipline. 
If the output of process "aH is the input of process "b", 
then this means that 'b" depends oh 'a" in order to operate. 
This is commonly a time dependency, but it may be a politi- 
cal or threshold effect as well. For example, process "a" 
might be the decision-making process by which the farmer al- 
locates his variable inputs to production, and process "b" 
might be the production process by which these variable in- 
puts are converted (with a certain amount of help from the 
sun, rain, soil, and similar phenomena) into salable commo- 
dities. Conversely, many processes, such as market clear- 
ance, represent decisions made on the basis of a great deal 
of information generated at different points in time but 
considered simultaneously. The difference is critical, and 
one must build a system in such a way that there is never 
any danger of including factors whose contingency order is 
not correct within a single process or treating specific in- 
f o r m a t i o n  f l o w s  s e r i a t i m  w i t h i n  which  s i m u l t a n e i t y  o f  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  is  i m p o r t a n t .  
T h e r e  is a n o t h e r  c r i t i c a l  d i m e n s i o n  t o  p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d  
mode l s :  p o l i c y  r e p r e s e n t s  c o n t r o l .  And t h o  i n t e r a c t i o n  
be tween  c o n t r o l l e d  and c o n t r o l l i n g  s y s t e m s  c a n  o f t e n  b e  e f -  
f e c t i v e l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  s y s t e m  s u c h  a s  t h a t  
shown i n  F i g u r e  6 .  I n  s u c h  c a s e s ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w s  i n  b o t h  
d i r e c t i o n s ,  b u t  i t  is  a s y m m e t r i c .  The g e n e r a l  p a t t e r n  is 
f o r  c o n t r o l  i n p u t  t o  l e a d  t o  a  s y s t e m  r e s p o n s e  wh ich  is mon- 
i t o r e d  by  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  The c o n t r o l l e r  t h e n  a d a p t s  h i s  
i n p u t s  t o  r e f l e c t  h i s  i n c r e a s e d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  
and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  h i s  own g o a l s  ( F i g u r e  7 ) .  T h e s e  re- 
l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  n e v e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s ,  and t o  c o n s i d e r  them s o  
is a l w a y s  m i s l e a d i n g ,  i f  n o t  i n c o r r e c t .  As 2 g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  
p o l i c y  i n p u t s  i n t o  a  model a r e  n e v e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s  w i t h  t h e i r  
r e s u l t s ,  and t h e  r e s p o n s e s  o f  s u b s i d i a r y  a c t o r s  t o  p o l i c y  
i n p u t s  a t  t h e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  a r e  a l w a y s  o f  a c o n t i n g e n c y  s o r t  
( M e s a r o v i c  -- e t  a l . ,  1 9 7 0 ) .  
I f  p o l i c y  r e p r e s e n t s  c o n t r o l ,  i t  is a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  no 
s y s t e m  s u c h  a s  a g r i c u l t u r e  is f u l l y  c o n t r o l l a b l e .  Sone  
p r o c e s s e s  c a n n o t  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  by a v a i l a b l e  p o l i c y  i n s t r u -  
m e n t s ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  c a n  be a f f e c t e d  i n  s e v e r a l  ways by d i f -  
f e r e n t  a c t o r s .  A d i a g r a m  s u c h  a s  F i g u r e  8 ,  which  c o n n e c t s  
c o n t r o l l e r s  and a c t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o c e s s e s ,  c a n  
b e  v e r y  r e v e a l i n g .  Such a d i a g r a m  is i m p l i c i t  i n  a n y  model 
o f  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  is se ldom e x p l i c i t .  
We p r e v i o u s l y  t o u c h e d  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how o n e  d e t e r -  
m i n e s  wh ich  a c t o r s  must  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  a complex  p o l i c y  
a n a l y s i s  and  wh ich  o n e s  may s a f e l y  be n e g l e c t e d .  W e  c a n  now 
answer  i t  much more e f f e c t i v e l y .  Any model is u l t i m a t e l y  a  
f ramework f o r  i n t e r a c t i n g  p r o c e s s e s .  A s  s u c h ,  t h e  s i g n i f  i- 
c a n c e  o f  a n y  g i v e n  a c t o r  c a n  be  measu red  by w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
h i s  a d a p t i v e  r e s p o n s e s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  b e h a v i o r  
o f  some p r o c e s s  wh ich  t h e  key a c t o r s  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  c o n t r o l .  
I f  s o ,  t h e n  t h e s e  a d a p t i v e  r e s p o n s e s  -- and h e n c e  t h e  a c t o r  
making them -- must  be  c o n s i d e r e d .  I f  h i s  r e s p o n s e s  d o  n o t  
a l t e r  t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  key  a c t o r s '  c h o s e n  c o n t r o l  t a c -  
t i c s ,  t h e n  h e  c a n  be  n e g l e c t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h i s  p r o c e s s .  O f  c o u r s e  i t  may be  p o s s i b l e  t o  n e g l e c t  a  
g i v e n  a c t o r  by t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  o n e  f e a s i b l e  p o l i c y  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  a  g i v e n  g o a l  s e t ,  b u t  h e  may s t i l l  h a v e  a  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t  r o l e  i n  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c y .  The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  a n  a c -  
t o r  i n  a  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  s i t u a t i o n  d e p e n d s  on  t h e  p o l i c y  i n  
q u e s t i o n ,  less  on t h e  g o a l s  t o  wh ich  i t  is d i r e c t e d .  
SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
The picture given here is one of immense complexity, 
with several taxonomies needed simply to describe the com- 
plexity, much less to deal with it. In order to build 
policy-oriented models at all, one must recognize a gradient 
of simplification. At the extremes, one must either reduce 
complexity to fewer aspects of the problem, retain the 
number of aspects but reduce the complexity of interactions, 
or retain the complexity of the system within the analysis 
but external to the model. The first is mathematically more 
elegant, but the latter two are probably more generally use- 
ful and can be carried out using the technique of scenario 
analysis. 
If a simulation model is an excellent device for exa- 
mining the impact of policies on a larger system, it is well 
adapted to the pre-implementation assessment phase of policy 
design. Multiple runs simulating different policy altena- 
tives show the sensitivity of different combinations of in- 
struments as well as the effectiveness of a priori chosen 
policy options. Each run represents a set-of assumptions 
(i.e. a policy set), or scenario (Knauer, 1978; Carr, 1976; 
Vanston et al., 1977. 
-- 
Exogenous vs. Endogenous Considerations within Scenarios 
Scenario analysis of policy problems is becoming in- 
creasingly widely used, and some variant is probably essen- 
tial to the pre-implementation assessment loop shown in Fig- 
ure 1 (Kahalas, 1977; Committee on Water Resources Planning, 
1976; Goeller -- et al., 1977). It recognizes that policy 
represents an attempt by decision-makers to respond to ex- 
plicit problems and that the evolution of policies at any 
point in time need not be a continuation of past policies. 
At the extremes, policies may change rather radically with 
changes in government or ministers, or policy evolution may 
be a series of small increments that respond to problems of 
the moment and show a minimum of concern either for the fu- 
ture or for continuity with the stimuli which have governed 
policy steps in the past. In any case, goals of societies 
change, as do the instruments at their disposal for reaching 
them. It is obvious that policy at this level cannot be en- 
dogenized into a model, but must rather be supplied exo- 
genously by a decision-maker or a user simulating a 
decision-maker (Mesarovic and Pestel, 1974) . The user and 
the model are linked during the scenario analysis process, 
so that the user is in essence a "model of himself". 4 
This should not be taken to mean that the effects of 
policies which are consistent with the past cannot be endo- 
genized and that approaches which attempt to do so, such as 
econometrics, are not successful. Such models have too good 
a track record to allow this to be said. But econometric 
estimation can embody only the results of policy, not policy 
itself. And policies which may change radically in the fu- 
ture are not reflected in past time-series or cross- 
sectional data. More important, perhaps, when a policy is 
assumed to be embodied in an estimation procedure, it is not 
accessible for evaluation. The trajectory of actions and 
instrument settings implicit in the data and which have been 
assumed by the estimation procedures are fixed in the model. 
They can form only a marginal part of any set of tactical 
alternatives involved in policy design. 
Scenario analysis is not a single or a simple tech- 
nique. There is a gradient of how much should be considered 
exogenously. At one extreme, policy is entirely exogenous, 
(Mesarovic, Pestel, -- et al., 1974; Clapham, 1977). Scenario 
policy specification nust be very complete, all-inclusive, 
and highly realistic. It is not acceptable for important 
factors to be neglected. An exogenous scenario must 
represent a thoughtful assessment of the patterns of avail- 
able instruments. This is one of its great strengths as 
well as its greatest difficulty: the user must know what he 
is talking about. Where the policy instruments are rela- 
tively straightforward, and where their use is a thoughtful 
response to conditions and represents a commitment of the 
government (or other actor) to a changed way of dealing with 
a problem, this can be a highly useful approach. 
The exogenous scenario is also useful where the rules 
of actors' behavior cannot be delineated. In this sense, 
the scenario no longer represents a thoughtful policy com- 
mitment from the actor in question. Rather it represents a 
guess about the composite behavior of a number of different 
actors. In most cases, the exogenous scenario as it is used 
in practical policy modeling represents a cross between 
these two modes. The disadvantages of exogenous scenarios 
are also significant and must be specified. They do not 
respond directly to changes in the structure of the system. 
Only by close interaction between user and model can the 
learning process proceed. This is costly both in user time 
4 This is a characterization by Prof. Peter D. Junger of 
the School of Law, Case Western Reserve University, 
Cleveland, Ohio. The same argument is implicit in the 
caveats about "hard" and "soft" variables and the role 
of judgement in Mendell and Tanner (1975). 
and in computer time. 
At the other end of the gradient, much policy may be 
considcred endogenously by the model. Behavioral equations 
may represent societal behavior which cannot be controlled, 
policy decisions, or anything in between (Kopelman and 
Weaver, 1978). The advantage of this approach is that simu- 
lation of behavior is dynamic and responsive to changing 
conditions, just as in the real world. Such policies and 
their associated instruments are not evaluated by the model. 
But if the rules of generation for such policies are suffi- 
ciently well understood that endogenization is possible, 
then this would not be necessary. There are many examples 
where policy rules are understood and where endogenization 
is appropriate, such as pricing behavior for agricultural 
commodities within the European Economic Community. The 
same may be true of the behavior of key actors in a system. 
But rules which apply to one society may not apply to anoth- 
er. For example, it is appropriate to assume that farmers 
in North America or Western Europe act in such a way as to 
try to maximize their profit. But the farmer in most poor 
developing countries does not act to maximize profit, but 
rather acts to satisfice between profit and survival. Any 
agronomist with field experience in developing countries can 
tell stories about farmers planting many lines of crops, of- 
ten in the same field, so that individual yields of all were 
depressed. The results did not lead to profit maximization 
in any sense. Rather they led to a meager profit in a good 
year and enough food for the farmer and his family to eat in 
a poor year. 
It is likely that some factors will be endogenized and 
some will be exogenized in any useful scenario-based policy 
model. Many tradeoffs must be carefully considered during 
the model design process. These include detail of systems 
response, transparency of model structure to the user, and 
breadth of analysis. 
The Technique of Scenario Specification 
- -
The scenario specification process can be summarized in 
Figure 9. The basis of the analysis is the motive scenario, 
a set of motivations which determines the purposes, direc- 
tions, and boundaries for the analysis. These goals can be 
regarded as the problem set. Once the motive scenario is 
chosen, a set of preferred strategies and tactics are deter- 
mined for the actors who are considered in the analysis, and 
the instrusients and instrument settings are chosen. 
A specific scenario comprises a set of instrument set- 
tings which is thought appropriate to realize the motive 
s c e n a r i o .  In  p r i n c i p l e ,  an i n f i n i t e  number of s p e c i f i c  
s c e n a r i o s  might correspond t o  any motive s c e n a r i o ,  and i n  
p r a c t i c e  t h e  number may be very l a r g e  (Biswas,  1975) .  The 
a n a l y s t  m u s t  g e n e r a t e  a  l a r g e  number of p o s s i b l e  s c e n a r i o s  
and f i l t e r  ou t  a l l  but t h e  most u s e f u l .  The mechanism may 
be e n t i r e l y  i n t u i t i v e ,  o r  i t  may involve t h e  use of s p e c i a l  
techniques .  The r e s u l t  of t h i s  is  a  r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  number 
of s c e n a r i o s  which w i l l  a c t u a l l y  be assessed  using t h e  s i m u -  
l a t i o n  model. 
Implementation r e q u i r e s  f i r s t  t h a t  t h e  s c e n a r i o  be 
t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  model input  s o  t h a t  i t  can be handled by t h e  
computer. This  is  p o s s i b l e  on ly  t o  t h e  degree  t h a t  t h e  
parameters  of t h e  model a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  "handlesn  f o r  p o l i c y  
a c t i o n s .  The va r ious  e lements  of t h e  p o l i c y  s e t  m u s t  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  model v a r i a b l e s  and then t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  n u -  
merica l  i npu t s .  When t h e  input  s e t  is complete,  t h e  model 
can be run,  and t h e  ou tpu t  r e f l e c t s  t h e  c a l c u l a t e d  responses  
of t h e  system t o  t h e  p o l i c y  a c t i o n s  s imula ted  by t h e  i npu t s .  
Any s c e n a r i o  then c o n s i s t s  of an input  s e t  r e f l e c t i n g  ac- 
t i o n s  of t h e  policy-maker and an ou tpu t  s e t  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  
behavior of t h e  system. This r e l a t i o n s h i p  is summarized in  
some d e t a i l  i n  Figure  10. 
Af te r  t he  model has  been run,  t h e  r e s u l t s  m u s t  be in-  
t e r p r e t e d ,  both f o r  t h e  performance of t h e  po l i cy  s c e n a r i o  
and f o r  t h e  adequacy of t h e  model. The f i r s t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
degree  t o  which t h e  p o l i c y  s c e n a r i o  is capable  of r e a l i z i n g  
the  motive s c e n a r i o ;  t h e  second r e f e r s  t o  t he  model v a l i d i t y  
and t h e  degree  t o  which the  model and i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  
sof tware  a r e  capable  of a s s e s s i n g  s c e n a r i o s  of i n t e r e s t  t o  
u se r s .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  both of t h e s e  dimensions c o n s i d e r s  
both t h e  p o l i c i e s  being t e s t e d  and t h e  c a p a c i t y  of t h e  model 
t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e i r  des ign .  Scenar io  a n a l y s i s  may show t h a t  
t h e  g o a l s  cannot  be met o r  t h a t  they  a r e  no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
ambit ious ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  motive s c e n a r i o  should be changed. 
I t  may suggest  changes i n  t he  method of gene ra t ing  o r  b u i l d -  
ing s p e c i f i c  s c e n a r i o s ,  and i t  may lead t o  new s t r a t e g i e s  or  
t a c t i c s .  I t  may lead t o  d i f f e r e n t  methods of t r a n s l a t i n g  
po l i cy  s c e n a r i o s  i n t o  model i n p u t ,  and i t  may even lead  t o  
changes i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  model i t s e l f .  
Perhaps t h e  most d i f f i c u l t  p a r t  of a  scenario-based 
p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  is t he  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
scena r io .  T h i s  is a  summary of a l l  of t h e  d e f a u l t  p o l i c y  
s e t s  of t h e  " h i g h e s t - p r o b a b i l i t y "  or  "s ta tus -quo"  s o r t .  
Here is  clone most of t h e  r e sea rch  on "knowing what y o u ' r e  
t a l k i n g  abou t , "  a s  t h e  a n a l y s t  develops  a  b a s i c  f e e l i n g  fo r  
t h e  p o l i c y  s i t u a t i o n  in  t he  s o c i e t y .  C a l i b r a t i o n  and h i s -  
t o r i c a l  v a l i d a t i o n  of t h e  model a r e  g e n e r a l l y  c a r r i e d  ou t  a s  
p a r t  of t h e  r e f e r e n c e  s c e n a r i o  p roces s ,  and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of 
the model is brought to a level where it can recapitulate 
the past. But policy analysis and design are seldom done 
successfully with regard only to the past: they are in- 
herently future-oriented. Therefore historical validation 
is not sufficient. The reference scenario is also a set of 
default parameters for future projection. It thus reauires 
sufficient understanding of the qualitative causes of the 
patterns of the past that they can be extrapolated into the 
future, given the perspective and realities of the present. 
Only then have we devised an adequate reference scenario. 
The function of the reference scenario is to serve as a 
basis against which other scenarios can be judged, knowing 
that directed and informed change is likely to be more so- 
cially acceptable -- and therefore more likely -- than 
stasis. There are many ways of generating scenarios. The 
types of motive scenarios considered as well as the breadth 
and intensity of actions depends on the purpose of the 
analysis. Different actors have different roles, and the 
number and positions of actors considerd has a major effect 
on the analysis. To a degree at least, the strategy- 
tactic-instrument set is actor-specific, and the analysis 
may be fairly straightforward once the actors to be con- 
sidered have been specified. But in some cases, actors can 
change their alliances, their coalitions and their relative 
roles. These may be subtle changes, but they may have pro- 
found effects. 
Conflicting Goals - of Modeling Efforts: Multiple Clients 
Simulation models of complex policy are generally very 
large interdisciplinary multi-actor models. Such models can 
generally have many potential clients, especially those 
models which treat international problems or problems with 
international implications. But it is not always possible 
for potential clients to agree on model structure or analyt- 
ical approach. It is not even always possible for people 
working on the same model or within the same group to agree 
on these factors. If the usefulness of a model is any cri- 
terion of its worth, it would seem that a model which could 
serve more than one client effectively would be more 
worthwhile than a model which could serve only one client. 
The disagreements between people in the modeling pro- 
cess can occur at any phase of model development. If the 
disagreement is over scenario specification, then it can be 
resolved by allowing different clients to establish dif- 
ferent scenarios. This is to be expected and is often use- 
ful to modelers, as different clients often represent dif- 
ferent actors within the system, and their differences can 
point out important factors of system structure. The dif- 
ferent actors operate from different motive scenarios, and 
they have different instruments available to them. It is 
only reasonable that their different interests result in 
different specific scenarios. 
But the differences may also be in the interpretation 
of the processes which should be considered and in their re- 
lative importance. These too can be resolved, at least to a 
degree, through building flexibility into the model so that 
different modules can be substituted for different clients. 
Indeed it may be possible to alter structure efficiently 
through alteration of parameters. Interpretation of 
processes may be a very important problem, but it is likely 
to be most serious if the proper foundation for the modeling 
effort was not laid, if the various actors and instrument 
sets were not identified, and if no effort was paid to ac- 
comodating potential users at future points in time. An ef- 
fort to develop a model by a strategy that allows for max- 
imum flexibility should make it possible to work out process 
disagreements by substituting modules on a process-by- 
process basis. 
The most serious disagreement which can come up in a 
modeling effort is with respect to model focus. It is very 
difficult to resolve problems which come about because peo- 
ple disagree on the way system boundaries should be set. 
This disagreement does not involve processes or modules 
within a construct which can be "unplugged" and "plugged in" 
but rather the fundamental rationale behind the construction 
of the model. But even this can be ameliorated if a com- 
mittment is made to disagree but to accommodate at the same 
time. In this case, we need to identify both the "lowest 
common denominator" and also the "highest common denomina- 
tor ." The former refers to those parts of the model which 
can, in fact, be common to the various multiple clients. 
Ideally, this will be all or at least most of the simplest 
version of the model. The "highest common denominator" is a 
hypothetical model with specifications which would enable it 
to meet all requirements of all clients even though it might 
be impossible to implement and almost certainly would not be 
very useful. One must then identify the options that must 
be left open for each client. As the "lowest common denomi- 
nator" model is being built, care should be taken to close 
as few options as possible. If this is done, the modeling 
effort can generate a family of models with a common core 
and the capability for disparate application. 
A PLAN FOR MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Computer simulation models can process vast quantities 
of information, data, and judgements to bring them to a form 
useful for policy assessment and design. That is their 
power, but unless they are constructed and presented so that 
they can be used, they have no role whatsoever. Model- 
building is a highly dynamic process where the state of a 
model at any point in time is determined by clients, model- 
builders, and technical factors such as the information 
available to both and the available computer capacity. 
The key to the usefulness of policy-oriented simulation 
models is the relationship between the model-builder and the 
policy-maker. Some care must be given to building this re- 
lationship early in the exercise. The model-builder must 
understand what the policy-maker needs, and the latter must 
have a feeling for what the former can provide him and how 
it will fit into his decision-making structure. Neither of 
these points can be generalized. The policy-maker may need 
help in assessing the differences between available options, 
getting a feel for the wider implications of options he has 
already chosen, or designing new and unique options. But 
what he needs depends on the nature and dynamics of the par- 
ticular problems at hand as well as his own personality and 
position. In the same way, model-builders can deliver ad- 
vice, predictions, projections, or interpretations at vary- 
ing levels of sophistication and detail. These are also in 
accordance with their personalities and backgrounds. 
Policy modeling is an iterative process. The model- 
builder must proceed on the basis of tentative understand- 
ings of the system as the policy-maker sees it, and his view 
of the system and the nature of the model he builds are up- 
dated through interaction with his client. These under- 
standings must be tentative, both because complex policy 
systems in the real world are constantly changing, and also 
because it is unrealistic to expect that a model-builder's 
perception of the system is good enough that he can build 
the right model the first time. 
Perhaps the first basis that needs to be agreed on con- 
cerns the taxonomies of the overall analysis. What actors 
must be considered? For agricultural policy, this clearly 
includes farmers and numerous government agencies. It prob- 
ably includes marketers for agricultural chemicals and 
machinery, if they affect farmers' decisions on uses of fer- 
tilizers and pesticides. But the system may respond very 
strongly to people who have no direct role in agriculture 
and who would almost certainly be overlooked by a modeler. 
Examples are pressure groups and agencies regulating agr i- 
cultural inputs or commodities. Next, what is the problem 
as perceived by the policy-maker? How does this perception 
correspond to that of the other actors, and what do the 
differences in perception say about the nature of the sys- 
tem? Are there instruments which might be available for 
solving the problem but which are not being used, or which 
could be used better? What constrains people's actions? We 
are commonly aware of the legislative constraints, but the 
indirect constraints which stem from culture, tradition, or 
the structural interactions among actors or institutions may 
be equally important. 
It goes without saying that no model is ever complete; 
nor can any model be expectpd to show complete correspon- 
dence with the real world. Simply because the model-builder 
i's aware of the important actors, their perceptions of the 
system, and the instruments available and the constraints on 
their use, does not mean that he should or even could in- 
clude them in his model. Indeed one of the greatest advan- 
tages of the scenario approach is that it enables model- 
builders to build simple models for which data are suffi- 
cient for parameter estimation, and for which the critical 
questions can still be addressed within the context of the 
overall analysis. If the model is built in a modular 
fashion, then it is relatively easy to make technical 
changes or even to have multiple groups working on a single 
model. In this fashion, the shared expertise of various 
groups of modelers and policy-makers can be brought to bear 
for the benefit of all of the constituent groups, while the 
different missions, approaches, and biases of the groups 
remain separate and mutually supportive, while allowing 
checks on each other. 
FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1: Schema of policy process 
Figure 2: Examples of policy actors involved in food 
systems in a typical country, arranged by decreasing power 
from top to bottom, showing some types of interactions among 
actors. Emphasis is more on "downward" or "horizontal" ac- 
tions. "Upward" actions (e.g. a strike) are only left out 
in order not to confuse the diagram. 
Figure 3: Venn diagram showing a few important in- 
teractions among several disciplines with respect to agri- 
cultural production questions. Disciplines considered are 
agricultural production, development economics, water 
resources, ecology, and soil science. The interact ions 
point out at least 12 issues or foci which might be con- 
sidered in a comprehensive view of the problem. The 
descriptions below are only suggestive of these issues. 
There are many more. Likewise, there are many other possi- 
ble patterns for intersections among the disciplines. 
A .  Effect of technological growth on agricultur- 
al production. 
B. Effect of technological growth on irrigation 
technology and response to irrigation. 
C. Competition for water between agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors. 
D. Pest control and other ecological aspects of 
agricultural production. 
E. Pest control and fertilizer responses of ir- 
r igated agriculture. 
F. Soil pollution in irrigated agriculture; 
production response to changes in soil biota. 
G. Soil erosion, production response to soil 
pollution. 
H. Soil erosion, fertilizer leaching. 
I. Salinization; waterlogging of soils. 
J. Assessment of irrigation potential. 
K. Soil biota and salt content of irrigated 
soil. 
L. Yield responses of irrigated crops. 
Figure 4: Diagrammatic disaggregation of an economy 
showing agriculture in a broader sense (inside dashed line) 
in relation to the rest of the economy. 
Figure 5: Diagrammatic system showing process - a
through 9 and the flows of information among them. While 
the figure is abstract, it may be helpful to associate f and 
9 with market and allocation processes, respectively, a-and 
e with land use and technological inputs, respectively, c 
- 
with inputs to livestock, and - b and - d with crop and lives- 
tack production, respectively. 
Figure 6: Diagrammatic system showing processes a 
through CJ arrayed in a hierarchical system with three iev- 
els, I through 111. If the processes are the same as in 
Figure 5, then level 11 refers to the functions of the farm- 
er as governed to some degree by society (level 111); level 
I refers to the field-level processes which result in pro- 
duction. For the nature of the connection, see text and 
Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Interactions between controlling and con- 
trolled systems. 
Figure 8: The simplified system shown if Figures 5 and 
G illustrating some of the actions possible for some of the 
actors in the system. The actors included are as follows: 
G: Government: national and local 
I: International agencies, moneylenders, and 
corporations 
M: Manufactur ing firms within the country 
L: Landowners: large and small 
F: Farm operators: tenants, owner-operators 
The actions noted are as follows: 
1: Taxing and incentives 
2: Competition: both market-oriented and polit- 
ical 
3: Investment patterns 
4: Technological R&D support 
5: Market responses and assessment of future 
development 
6: Land-use patterns 
7: Care provided, expertise, services available 
8: Market manipulation, control 
4: Support for farm-market transportation 
Figure 9: Schema for the scenario analysis process. 
Figure 10: Schema for user-model interaction within 
the scenario analysis process. A scenario policy constella- 
tion Po is specified as an exogenous input so that it 
operates on ( * )  the model system So. The model is then run, 
and i ts  s t a t e  changes from So t o  S1. From t h i s  a l t e r e d  sys-  
tem s t a t e ,  we can deduce c e r t a i n  i n d i c a t o r s  11 which a l low 
the  user t o  determine t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of h i s  p o l i c y  
scena r io  Po t o  meet h i s  goa l s .  In  g e n e r a l ,  i t  w i l l  be use- 
f u l  t o  compose a  new p o l i c y  s c e n a r i o  P1 based on t h e  i n -  
c rease  i n  system unders tanding ,  and r e p e a t  t h e  process .  
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Figure  1 Scheme of po l i cy  process .  
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Figure  2 Examples o f  p o l i c y  a c t o r s  involved  i n  food systems i n  a  t y p i c a l  c o u n t r y ,  a r r anged  
by d e c r e a s i n g  power from t o p  t o  bottom, showing some t y p e s  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  among 
a c t o r s .  Emphasis i s  more on t h e  "downward" o r  " h o r i z o n t a l "  a c t i o n s .  "Upward" 
a c t i o n s  ( e . g . ,  a  s t r i k e )  a r e  on ly  l e f t  o u t  i n  o r d e r  n o t  t o  c l o g  t h e  diagram. 
DEVELOPhlENT 
ECONOMICS 
Figure  3 Venn diagram showing a  few impor tan t  i n t e r a c t i o n s  
among s e v e r a l  d i s c i p l i n e s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  a g r i c u l -  
t u r a l  p roduc t ion  ques t ions .  D i s c i p l i n e s  cons ide red  
a r e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduc t ion ,  development economics, 
wate r  r e s o u r c e s ,  eco logy ,  and s o i l  s c i e n c e .  The 
i n t e r a c t i o n s  p o i n t  o u t  a t  l e a s t  1 2  i s s u e s  o r  f o c i  
which might  be cons idered  i n  a  comprehensive view 
o f  t h e  problem. The d e s c r i p t i o n s  below a r e  o n l y  
s u g g e s t i v e  o f  t h e s e  i s s u e s .  There a r e  many more. 
Likewise ,  t h e r e  a r e  many o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  p a t t e r n s  
f o r  i n t e r s e c t i o n s  among t h e  d i s c i p l i n e s .  
A. E f f e c t  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  growth on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduc t ion .  
B. E f f e c t  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  growth on i r r i g a t i o n  technology and 
response  t o  i r r i g a t i o n .  
C. Compet i t ion f o r  wate r  between a g r i c u l t u r a l  and non- 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r s .  
D. P e s t  c o n t r o l  and o t h e r  e c o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p roduc t ion .  
E .  P e s t  c o n t r o l  and f e r t i l i z e r  responses  o f  i r r i g a t e d  
a g r i c u l t u r e .  
I?. S o i l  p o l l u t i o n  i n  i r r i g a t e d  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  p roduc t ion  response  
t o  changes i n  s o i l  b i o t a .  
G.  S o i l  e r o s i o n ,  p roduc t ion  response  t o  s o i l  p o l l u t i o n .  
H. S o i l  e r o s i o n ,  f e r t i l i z e r  l each ing .  
I. S a l i n i z a t i o n ,  wate r logging  of s o i l s .  
J. Assessment o f  i r r i g a t i o n  p o t e n t i a l .  
K .  S o i l  b i o t a  and s a l t  c o n t e n t  o f  i r r i g a t e d  s o i l .  
L. Yield  responses  o f  i r r i g a t e d  c rops .  
SERVICES CZT! 
F i g u r e  fl Diagrammatic d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  an  economy showing a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  a  b roade r  s e n s e  
( i n s i d e  dashed l i n e )  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  economy. 
F i g u r e  5 Diagrammatic system showing p roces ses  a  through g and 
t h e  flows o f  in format ion  among them. While t h e  f i g u r e  
is  a b s t r a c t ,  it may be  h e l p f u l  t o  a s s o c i a t e  f  and g  
w i t h  market  and a l l o c a t i o n  p roces ses  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a  
and e wi th  l and  use  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n p u t s  respec-  
t i v e l y ,  c w i t h  i n p u t s  t o  l i v e s t o c k ,  and b  and d  w i t h  
c rop  and l i v e s t o c k  produc t ion ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
F i g u r e  G Diagram'lat ic  sys tem showing p r o c e s s e s  a  th rough  g  
a r r a y e d  i n  a  m u l t i l e v e l  h i e r a r c h i c a l  sys tem w i t h  
t h r e e  s t r a t a  I t h rough  111. I f  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  a r e  
t h e  same a s  i n  F i g u r e  8 ,  t h e n  s t r a t u m  I11 r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  fa rmer  a s  governed t o  some 
d e g r e e  by s t r a t u m  111; s t r a t u m  I r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
f i e l d - l e v e l  p r o c e s s e s  which r e s u l t  i n  p roduc t i on .  
For  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  connec t i on ,  see t e x t  and 
F i g u r e  10. 
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F i g u r e  8 ,  The s i m p l i f i e d  sys t em shown i n  F i g u r e s  8 and  9 show- 
i n g  some o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  some o f  t h e  
a c t o r s  i n  t h e  sys tem.  The a c t o r s  i n c l u d e d  a r e  as 
f o l l o w s :  
G: Government, n a t i o n a l  and  l o c a l  
I: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  agenc ie s ,  moneylenders ,  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
M: Manufac tu r ing  f i r m s  w i t h i n  c o u n t r y  
L: Landowners, l a r g e  and s m a l l  
F: Farm o p e r a t o r s ,  t e n a n t s ,  owner -ope ra to r s  
h - 
The a c t i o n s  n o t e d  are a s  f o l l o w s :  
- 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
INPUTS 
L 
Taxing  a n d  i n c e n t i v e s  
Compe t i t i on ;  b o t h  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  and  p o l i t i c a l  
Inves tmen t  p a t t e r n s  
T e c h n o l o g i c a l  RED s u p p o r t  
Marke t  r e s p o n s e s  and a s s e s s m e n t  o f  f u t u r e  deve lopments  
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F i g u r e  9' Schemat ic  d iagram of t h e  s c e n a r i o  analysis process. 
THE POLICY SYSTEM (MODEL) REVISED INDiCATORS NEW 
(I.E. CONSTELLATION IN BASE STATE SYSTEM POLICY 
OF ACTIONS) 
F i g u r e  10 Schema f o r  user-model i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  s c e n a r i o  a n a l y s i s  p roces s .  
A s c e n a r i o  p o l i c y  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  P O  i s  s p e c i f i e d  a s  an  exogenous i n p u t  s o  
t h a t  it o p e r a t e s  on (* I  t h e  model system S O .  The model i s  then  run ,  and 
i t s  s t a t e  changes from S O  t o  s'. From t h i s  a l t e r e d  sys tem s t a t e  w e  can 
deduce c e r t a i n  i n d i c a t o r s  1.l which a l l o w  t h e  u se r  t o  de te rmine  t h e  e f f e c -  
t i v e n e s s  o f  h i s  p o l i c y  s c e n a r i o  P O  t o  meet  h i s  g o a l s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  it 
w i l l  be u s e f u l  t o  compose a new p o l i c y  s c e n a r i o  P '  based on t h e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  sys tem unde r s t and ing ,  and r e p e a t  t h e  p r o c e s s .  
